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CAN DISPOSITIONALISM ABOUT BELIEF
VINDICATE DOXASTICISM ABOUT DELUSION?
JOSÉ EDUARDO PORCHER
Abstract. Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry.
However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a
number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the
mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response
to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate
the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing be-
liefs to delusional patients and the application of dispositionalism in the attempt to vindicate
doxasticism. I then assess this application and some responses to the objections to the dox-
astic characterization. Finally, I offer some conclusions about the limits of folk-psychological
concepts in the characterization and explanation of complex psychological phenomena such
as delusions.
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1. Introduction
Delusions have traditionally been thought of as beliefs. Indeed, they are referred to
as beliefs almost everywhere in the psychiatric literature, as exemplified by the latest
edition of what is perhaps its most influential handbook, the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Here is its definition of delusion:
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly
sustained despite what almost everybody else believes and despite what
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary.
(American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.819)
However, the implausibility of ascribing full-fledged belief to delusional subjects has
been hinted at at least since the 1910s, when both Jaspers’ General Psychopathology
and Bleuler’s Textbook of Psychiatry were published. The set of objections against the
traditional view forms a conspicuous obstacle for doxastic accounts.1
Lack of content
The first objection—originally raised by Jaspers (1913/1963) and elaborated re-
cently by Berrios (1991)and Sass (1994)—denies that delusions are contentful states.
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One may call this the expressivist (Gerrans 2001) or non-assertoric (Young 1999) ac-
count. This view is motivated by the fact that most (if not all) delusions appear obvi-
ously false or incoherent. The aforementioned Cotard delusion is a prized example of
proponents of this view. Berrios, for example, states that when a patient who utters a
verbal formula such as ‘I am dead’ or ‘My internal organs have been removed’ is ques-
tioned as to the real meaning of these assertions, she will not be able to coherently
discuss them or their implications. ‘Properly described’, says Berrios, ‘delusions are
empty speech-acts that disguise themselves as beliefs’ (1996, p.126, my emphasis).
‘Their so-called content refers neither to world, nor self’. ‘Delusions are so unlike
normal beliefs that it must be asked why we persist in calling them beliefs at all’
(1996, p.114–5). A wide variety of other cases besides Cotard’s can be summoned
in favor of such a view. For example, an intermetamorphosis patient claimed that
his mother changed into another person every time she put her glasses on (De Pauw
and Szulecka 1988); another patient that had the delusion that there was a nuclear
power station inside his body (David 1990); and yet another that had the delusion
of being both in Boston and in Paris at once (Weinstein and Kahn 1955).
Self-defeating content
One may not want to deny that delusional states possess content, and still object
that it is difficult to see how the delusional patient themselves could believe such
content. Again, Cotard patients are a fitting example. Bermudez voices this concern
in stating that there is ‘something content-irrational about the belief . . . that one
is dead—because, to put it mildly, the belief is pragmatically self-defeating’ (2001
p.479, my emphasis). Not only is it unclear that a self-defeating assertion such as ‘I
am dead’ could be coherently expressed, the question is open whether there can be
self-defeating beliefs to begin with (as opposed to mere verbal utterances).
Lack of evidence
A distinctly rationalist objection consists in pointing out that delusional subjects ap-
pear, as opposed to self-deceived ones, to lack reasons or evidence for their delusional
state. However faulty the reasons or flimsy (and biased) the evidence one may have
to support some self-deceptive belief, there will be nevertheless some kind of support
for such a belief. In contrast with this, Campbell cites the well-known case of ‘a pa-
tient who looked at a row of empty marble tables in a café and became convinced
that the world was coming to an end’ (2001, p.95). Notwithstanding the DSM defi-
nition of delusions (that they are held ‘despite what constitutes incontrovertible and
obvious proof or evidence to the contrary’), Campbell points out that it is difficult
to understand (to put it mildly) how an experience of marble tables could verify the
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proposition ‘The world is ending’. On the other hand, there is at any time a con-
siderable body of evidence against the truth of the delusional content, to which the
delusional subject seems utterly impervious. In turn, Egan (2009, p.266) observes
that if we take a certain responsiveness to evidence as essential to belief, then we’ll
be reluctant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the content of their
delusions. In other words, if there is a constitutive relationship between belief and
evidence (even in the case of irrational belief and improper evidence), then it seems
that delusional states do not warrant the ascription of delusional beliefs.
Theoretical reasoning
Many authors, such as Velleman (2000), take belief to be somehow aimed at truth.
This may constitute an objection to the doxastic conception of delusion in a spirit sim-
ilar to that of Gendler’s (2007) objection to the doxastic conception of self-deception.
It points to one of the ways in which delusional states present a degree of circumscrip-
tion that speaks against their being properly taken as beliefs (Young 1999, p.581).
Egan calls this property of delusional states inferential circumscription (2009, p.266).
As Bayne and Pacherie neatly put it, proponents of such a view of belief point out
that
A subject will normally accept the obvious logical implications of her be-
liefs—at least when these are pointed out to her. And when she realizes that
some of her beliefs are inconsistent, she will normally engage in a process
of revision to restore consistency. In contrast, deluded patients often fail to
draw the obvious logical consequences of their delusions and show little in-
terest in resolving apparent contradictions between their delusion and the
rest of their beliefs. (2005, p.164)
This is the precisely the spirit of the following claim by Currie and Ravenscroft:
If someone says that he has discovered a kind of belief that is peculiar in
that there is no obligation to resolve or even to be concerned about inconsis-
tencies between these beliefs and beliefs of any other kind, then the correct
response to him is to say that he is talking about something other than belief.
(2002, p.176)
However, the majority of patients with the Capgras delusion, for example, do not
draw the consequences the content of their delusion would usually mandate: their
worldview does not seem to change at all as a consequence of supposedly adopting the
belief that their spouses have been abducted and that the person they see in front of
them is an impostor (Davies and Coltheart 2000). Whatever this state is, therefore, it
seems that it is severely encapsulated, failing to be integrated with the subject’s web
of belief. But beliefs are themainstay of theoretical and practical reasoning and, while
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one may ascribe false belief to subjects for any number of reasons, a state that fails
to have the appropriate connections to the subject’s other mental states may not be
properly described as a belief.2 As exemplified by Currie and Ravenscroft, this view
is especially espoused by authors who (tacitly or explicitly) endorse a consistency
constraint on belief-ascription.
Indeed, authors such as Quine and Ullian (1970), as well as Fodor (1983), have
argued that one of the attributes of a belief qua belief is its property of being insep-
arably connected with other beliefs of potentially widely diverse contents. Quine’s
answer as to why beliefs should be webbed or interconnected with other beliefs in a
way that precludes severe encapsulation rests on the conditions of epistemic assess-
ment of beliefs—for instance, whether I am warranted in believing that an acquain-
tance of mine lives in Chicago may depend on whether I believe that Chicago is a city
and believe that cities are bigger than towns, etc. And for Quine, the conditions of
epistemic assessment of beliefs are part of their functional role; beliefs are states or
attitudes that are constituents in (what Fodor calls) the central processing that takes
place in the mind. Thus, like-minded theorists will deny that delusional subjects are
in the hold of belief.
Practical reasoning
Belief has profound connections to action, and many delusional subjects fail to act in
ways expected of agents who really believed the content of their delusions. As Cur-
rie (2000, p.175) puts it, delusion exerts a powerful psychological force, absorbing
inner mental resources, but it fails to engage behavior in the way that we would ex-
pect of genuine belief . This seems likely due to the inferential circumscription noted
above. Egan calls this characteristic of delusional patients behavioral circumscription
(2009, p.266). It was noted by Bleuler, who stated that his delusional patients ‘rarely
follow up the logic to act accordingly, as, for instance, to bark like a dog when they
profess to be a dog. Although they may refuse to admit the truth, they behave as if
the expression is only to be taken symbolically’ (1916/1924). In the same manner,
Capgras patients who (for all we can see) sincerely affirm ‘This is not my wife’ or ‘My
mother has been replaced by an impostor’ do not as a consequence of this go looking
for their missing loved ones, nor do they call the police to report the breaking and
entering perpetrated by the person they claim to be an impostor.
Lack of appropriate affect
Finally, delusional patients often fail to exhibit the affective or emotional responses
one would expect of a person who believes the content of her assertions (Sass 1994,
p.23–4). We may call this affective circumscription, since what is observed is a failure
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of integration between the subjects’ delusional state and their emotional lives. Cap-
gras patients are more often than not unmoved by the fate of their relatives whom,
according to the doxastic interpretation of this delusion, they believe to have been
abducted (Davies and Coltheart 2000). Why don’t they exhibit the affective responses
which the relevant beliefs would lead us to expect?
The last four objections are different aspects of what Bortolotti terms bad inte-
gration. She observes that ‘although it is possible for a belief system to have some
internal tension, most philosophers resist the thought that subjects capable of hav-
ing beliefs can have dissonant attitudes simultaneously activated and operative at
the forefront of their minds’ (2010, p.62). In other words, delusions lack the holis-
tic character expected of beliefs and do not respect the notion of a coherent belief
system whose adjustments to one belief implies adjustments to many others (Young
2000, p.49). Belief-ascription in the context of delusion, then, is only admissible after
explaining away these disparities between the roles that delusional states play in the
overall cognitive economy of delusional patients and those roles we expect beliefs
to play (following either folk-psychological intuitions or fully articulated theories of
belief).
2. A dispositional approach to delusion
Having briefly introduced the concept of delusion and the problems faced by dox-
astic explanations, I now turn to the main purpose of this paper, which is to exam-
ine the tenability of a dispositional account of delusional belief. Instead of giving
up doxasticism altogether in favor of an alternative characterization, such as Cur-
rie’s and Ravenscroft’s (2002) metacognitive account, which relies on propositional
imagination rather than belief, the strategy I will rehearse consists in presenting a
non-standard account of belief, and trying to show that deluded subjects meet the
criteria it proposes for being in a belief-state. My starting point will be an overview
of the dispositionalist theory of belief proposed by Schwitzgebel (2001; 2002), to
then explore its subsequent appropriation in the literature on delusions by Bayne
and Pacherie (2005).
2.1. In-between believing and not believing
H.H. Price, in his famous series of lectures on belief, discussed the not uncommon
phenomenon wherein a person may systematically feel himself to be and act as
if he were fully committed to p in one set of circumstances, while systematically
feeling and acting as if the opposite were true in others. He called this ‘half-belief’
(1960/1969, p.302–14). More recently, Schwitzgebel (2001) recognized that there
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are countless cases in which a simple yes or no answer to the question ‘Does S believe
that p?’ doesn’t seem to be available, and that they can have a wide variety of causes.
From these cases, Schwitzgebel draws the following conclusion:
For any proposition p, it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite
accurately describable as believing that p, nor quite accurately describable
as failing to believe that p. Such a person, I will say, is in an ‘in-between state
of belief’ (2001, p.76).
By way of illustration, he offers three examples stemming from three different causes,
which are neither meant nor thought to be exhaustive. The first is gradual forgetting.
It concerns the ubiquitous case in which someone forgets, say, an old colleague’s last
name. Years ago, you knew your colleague’s full name. Now, you can only remember
his first name (and, perhaps, the first letter of his last name). Years from now, you
probably won’t remember his name at all. So the belief that your colleague’s name
was Konstantin Guericke was fully present when you were in college, and will be fully
absent when you are eighty years old. The question then is, what is the state you’re in
right now? Schwitzgebel asks: ‘is it plausible to think that in the years between there
was a discrete moment before which I absolutely had this belief and after which I
absolutely did not? At some point during the course of forgetting, I must be between
believing and failing to believe that his last name is ‘Guericke’ (or whatever)’ (2001,
p.77). Arguably, we spend most of our lives in such in-between states.
His second example is derived from our failure to think things through. Think of
a school teacher who mentions prime numbers in her lessons, correctly listing the
lower primes 2, 3, 5, 7, 11 etc. Now, when she is asked about or decides to offer the
definition of ‘prime number’, she typically says that a prime number is any positive
integer that can be divided evenly only by 1 and itself. This definition is not correct,
however, since the number 1 is a positive integer evenly divisible only by 1 and itself,
but it is not a prime number. On the other hand, if you asked the school teacher if 1
is a prime she would promptly answer that it isn’t. So now the question is, does she
believe that all positive integers which are evenly divisible only by themselves and
1 are prime? We have reasons to answer in the affirmative, for instance, she would
never list 1 as a prime number. But we also have reasons to answer in the negative, for
instance, the occasions on which she would be disposed to offer a correct definition
of primes are few. For this reason, Schwitzgebel claims that the most careful and
accurate description would requires us to withhold the attribution of a belief.
Finally, there is variability with context and mood. Here, Schwitzgebel evokes a
familiar example in the same vein as Price’s famous case of the half-believing the-
ist. Price suggests the case of someone who on Sundays bears all the subjective and
objective marks of someone who believes that there is a God, but who on weekdays
bears none of them. Schwitzgebel, on the other hand, suggests the case of someone
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who, in certain moods and in certain contexts, bears all the subjective and objective
marks, and who, in other moods and contexts, doesn’t. (The latter spectrum may in-
clude circumstances from those of weakened confidence, as when someone thinks of
God as ‘a beautiful metaphor’, to those where confidence is removed completely from
recognition or memory.) Though he may be a regular Sunday churchgoer, he does not
feel the urge to defend himself or his religion when, for example, his atheistic friends
mock religious belief. In fact, at such moments (especially on weekdays), he may
even find himself mildly convinced of the incongruousness of theistic dogma. How
can we decide, then, whether he believes that God exists? The point is that a simple
yes or no answer would be misleading. Thus, the widespread presence of problematic
circumstances for belief-ascription such as these encourages the development of an
account of belief that allows us to talk intelligibly about such in-between states—that
allows us to say more than just that the subject ‘sort of’ believes something.
2.2. Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief
Given the conviction that there is a continuum ranging from complete absence to
complete presence of any given belief, a probabilistic treatment might be thought
to manage cases of in-between believing. According to such an account, a person’s
beliefs would be characterized by a degree of confidence ranging from 0 (i.e. ab-
solute confidence in the falsity of p) to 1 (i.e. absolute confidence in the truth of
p), with 0.5 in between—perhaps representing suspension of judgment or a state
of skeptical doubt. Such an approach may be thought to account for at least some
of the cases because we could assign our half-believing theist, for example, with a
degree of confidence of 0.7 or 0.8. However, this would consist in a gross oversim-
plification of the kind of uncertainty or wavering present in the cases discussed. The
school teacher and the half-believing theist cannot be properly described as simply
fluctuating between different degrees of confidence, since they are, ‘at a single time,
disposed quite confidently to assert one thing in one sort of situation and to assert
its opposite in another’ (Schwitzgebel 2001, p.79). Nor can the process of gradually
forgetting someone’s last name be properly translated into a slow decline in one’s
confidence in the truth of some proposition. A purely probabilistic approach fails to
capture the vast array of detail present in these cases.
Furthermore, it would seem that traditional representational accounts of belief
cannot provide a way of successfully dealing with in-between belief states either.
Indeed, to suggest that someone is in an in-between representational state appears
even more unnatural than the probabilistic strategy would have it. Most talk of belief
as representation makes out belief to be a categorical state—having a belief that p is
something like having the sentence p inscribed in one’s ‘belief box’ in the language of
thought, according to one popular account. The metaphor must be pushed, though,
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if representationalists wish to embrace the very plausible presence of halfway states.
Schwitzgebel points out that for that, however, they risk making a caricature of their
own account by incorporating, say, explanations of gradual forgetting in terms of a
sentence slowly ‘losing its color’, etc. To avoid the far-fetched claim that sentences
either are or aren’t inscribed in the belief box, then, Schwitzgebel opts for pursuing
a more flexible explanation of the nature of belief and belief-ascription by appeal to
a revision of Ryle’s dispositionalism. Ryle argued that to believe something is simply
to be disposed to do and feel certain things in appropriate situations. To use his own
example, to believe that the ice you’re skating on is dangerously thin is, in his words:
[T]o be unhesitant in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in acquiesc-
ing in other people’s assertions to that effect, in objecting to statements to
the contrary, in drawing consequences from the original proposition, and so
forth. But it is also to be prone to skate warily, to shudder, to dwell in imagi-
nation on possible disasters and to warn other skaters. It is a propensity not
only to make certain theoretical moves but also to make certain executive
and imaginative moves as well as to have certain feelings. (1949, p.134–5)
A person who has the dispositions described in Ryle’s example matches what Schwitz-
gebel calls a dispositional stereotype. By a stereotype, he means a cluster of properties
we are apt to associate with something—be it an object, a class, or a property. An ex-
ample he adapts from Putnam (1975) is that of the stereotype of a tiger, whose prop-
erties include being striped and having four legs, among others.3 This doesn’t mean,
of course, that a three-legged tiger without stripes is not a tiger. It only means that
such a tiger wouldn’t be a stereotypical one. Furthermore, the accuracy of stereotypes
varies greatly in degree, so that the more or less objects instantiate their stereotypical
properties, the more or less accurate the stereotype will be.
Schwitzgebel characterizes dispositions by means of conditional statements of
the form ‘If condition C holds, then object O will (or is likely to) enter (or remain in)
state S’ (2002, p.250).4 O’s entering S is themanifestation of a disposition, whereas C
is the condition of manifestation, and the event of C’s obtaining is the trigger. There-
fore, O will have the relevant disposition if and only if the corresponding conditional
statement is true. Thus we may speak of dogs having the disposition to wag their tails
when excited because when they are excited (the trigger), they wag their tails (the
manifestation).
A dispositional stereotype is simply a stereotype whose elements are dispositional
properties. Many familiar stereotypes are dispositional, such as personality traits. For
example, being impulsive is (something like) being disposed to act without thinking
things through; being sympathetic is (something like) being disposed to easily putting
oneself in someone else’s position; etc. Just like having a personality trait is match-
ing a stereotype, Schwitzgebel claims, so too is having a belief. As a consequence,
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the list of dispositions associated with a given belief is as indefinite as that of hav-
ing a particular personality trait, and won’t be linked to it explicitly by a conscious
effort. The most fruitful way of thinking about dispositional stereotypes is, rather, as
consisting of clusters of dispositional properties (which we associate with particu-
lar stereotypes). In turn, with regard to the different kinds of dispositions belonging
specifically to the stereotype of belief (for instance, the belief that there is beer in the
fridge), Schwitzgebel identifies three main categories:
The most obvious, perhaps, are behavioral dispositions, the manifestations
of which are verbal and nonverbal behavior, such as, in the present case,
the disposition to say that there is beer in the fridge (in appropriate cir-
cumstances) and the disposition to go to the fridge (if one wants a beer).
Equally important, though rarely invoked in dispositional accounts of any
sort, are what may be called phenomenal dispositions, dispositions to have
certain sorts of conscious experiences. The disposition to say silently to one-
self, ‘there’s beer in my fridge’, and the disposition to feel surprise should one
open the fridge and find no beer are phenomenal dispositions stereotypical
of the belief that there is beer in the fridge. Finally, there are dispositions to
enter mental states that are not wholly characterizable phenomenally, such
as dispositions to draw conclusions entailed by the belief in question or to
acquire new desires or habits consonant with the belief. Call these cognitive
dispositions. (2002, p.252)
In Schwitzgebel’s dispositionalism, a person who possesses all the dispositions in
the stereotype for belief that p will always accurately be described as believing that
p. On the other hand, a person who possesses none of those dispositions will never
accurately be so described. What is especially relevant to the present investigation,
of course, are the cases in between those extremes—cases which, in all probability,
account for most of our beliefs. As we have seen, those cases include gradual learning
and forgetting and ignorance of related details, but also self-deception and, perhaps,
even some cases of delusion. That is, cases where some but not all of the dispositions
in a stereotype are present, and which help illustrate that having a disposition is not
something which can always be ascribed in black-and-white terms. The core idea of
this view with respect to belief, then, is that
To believe that p . . . is nothing more than to match to an appropriate degree
and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for believing that p.
What respects and degrees of match are to count as ‘appropriate’ will vary
contextually and so must be left as a matter of judgment. (2002, p.253)
The ability of such a view of belief to handle the gray area of ascription is made
clear by the postulate that no single disposition is either necessary nor sufficient
for the possession of any belief (since dispositionalism links belief-ascription to clus-
ters of dispositions). Schwitzgebel avoids the inflexibility of traditional accounts by
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admitting vagueness and context-dependency as integral to belief-ascription. As op-
posed to features that would entail undermining the value of ascription, they are
supposed to provide the margin of safety we as belief ascribers need. Finally, the
problem Schwitzgebel intends to deal with is fundamentally the same we face when
trying to ascribe belief to delusional patients, namely, that there are particular sub-
jects of whom there is reason to think that they believe p but also reason to think
that they do not believe p (or even that they believe ¬p).
2.3. Bayne’s and Pacherie’s appropriation
Bayne and Pacherie (2005) provide an attempt at restoring our ability, in the face
of the reviewed objections and of alternative accounts, to make belief-ascriptions
when talking about deluded subjects. As a motivation, they cite matters of practical
importance such as the implications that theoretical speculation has for the treat-
ment of delusions. They refer to cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), an important
form of therapy for delusions (Dickerson 2000), one of the essential components of
which involves questioning the consistency and plausibility of the patient’s delusions
(Chadwick, Brichwood and Trower 1996). This form of therapy, they argue, seems to
accord with the doxastic account, in that the therapist treats the delusional patient
as a believer of p and gently invites the patient to question the delusional belief.
Granted the important point that a sound methodology for the development of
philosophical theories of the human mind should carefully attend to its compatibility
with the relevant empirical data, the focus of my interest in their defense of dox-
asticism lies especially in their sketch of a theory of belief that, according to them,
can elude the usual objections. In order to establish that at least some delusions
qualify as beliefs they turn to Cherniak (1986) and Schwitzgebel (2002) for sup-
port. From Cherniak’s account of ‘minimal rationality’ they derive the claim that the
link between rationality and belief-ascription is much looser than classical theories of
belief-ascription generally allow. Interpretationism—the view that we can gain an un-
derstanding of the nature of the mental by reflecting on the nature of interpretation,
the process of ascribing propositional attitudes to an individual on the basis of what
she says and does—is one such theory. It endorses a general rationality constraint
that has been widely supported in the philosophical literature:
When we are not [rational], the cases defy description in ordinary terms of
belief and desire. (Dennett 1987, p.87)
If we are intelligibly to attribute attitudes and beliefs, or usefully to describe
motions as behavior, then we are committed to finding, in the pattern of
behavior, belief, and desire, a large degree of rationality and consistency.
(Davidson 1974, p.50)
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If we were to accept this, it would follow that the difficulty we face in trying to ex-
plain and predict irrational behavior in intentional terms stems from the fact that
irrational behavior does not support the ascription of intentional states with determi-
nate content. Rationality would be emphasized to the exclusion of almost all other
considerations.5 However, upon closer inspection, the use of the folk-psychological
concept of ‘belief’ (to focus on the intentional state we are presently concerned with)
indicates that its extension is not homogeneous at all. As we have already seen, there
are lots of kinds of different mental states we are prepared to call ‘belief’. Hence,
Bayne and Pacherie observe, even if they are right in that considerations of ratio-
nality play an important role in belief-ascription, theories like interpretationism ob-
scure the heterogeneity of the set of states apt to be considered beliefs. As Cherniak
urged, rationality constraints on belief-ascription should not be derived from a model
of ideal rationality. ‘Given our finitary predicament — the computational, memory,
and time limitations we are subject to — it is actually irrational for us to aspire to
ideal rationality’ (Bayne and Pacherie 2005, p.180). What this entails for the present
discussion is that the cognitive attitudes of delusional patients are continuous with
our ordinary beliefs—that is, there is no categorical difference between the abnor-
mal mental states observed in delusions and the normal states that constitute our
everyday cognitive economy. If this is right, it constitutes an important first step to-
ward a vindication of doxasticism about delusions. More important to the present
investigation, on the other hand, is Bayne’s and Pacherie’s appeal to Schwitzgebel’s
dispositional account of belief in order to explain away the delusional subject’s fail-
ure to manifest their beliefs in normal ways. From Schwitzgebel they derive the claim
that beliefs are context-dependent in a number of ways:
First, which dispositions are actualized is a function of several factors: (1)
the way the long-termmemory of the individual is structured, something that
depends in turn both on the cognitive organization of the species and on the
personal history of the individual, (2) the current external context, and (3)
the current motivational and affective set of the individual. Second, belief-
ascription is also context-dependent. According to Schwitzgebel, we have
dispositional stereotypes for beliefs, specific clusters of behavioral, cognitive,
and phenomenal dispositions we associate with given beliefs and expect to
be manifested in standard situations. We attribute to a subject full belief that
p if he conforms to the associated stereotype in standard situations and if his
deviations from the stereotype are readily explainable or excusable by appeal
to some non-standard feature of the situation in which they occur. When
a deviation from the stereotype cannot be excused or explained in this way,
whether or not the attributor ascribes the belief will depend on the context of
the belief ascription and what her interests are. (2005, p.181, my emphasis)
Dispositionalism does look like a very promising way to ensure that young children,
the forgetful, the negligent, the weak-willed, the self-deceived, and the deluded be
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ascribed beliefs, despite the lapses in thinking and behavior that sometimes pose a
challenge to these ascriptions. It makes it easy to secure permission to use belief-
ascriptive language in our descriptions of these individuals. That is so because, for
the dispositionalist, the question whether a subject should be ascribed the belief is
not just a matter of whether she manifests enough of the dispositions in the relevant
cluster but also of whether her not manifesting some of these dispositions can be
satisfactorily excused or explained by reference to non-standard aspects of her situa-
tion. Therefore, if deluded subjects’ failure to manifest their beliefs in normal ways is
excusable or explainable, their deviation from the dispositional stereotype associated
with the relevant beliefs ceases to be a hindrance to belief-ascription.
Nevertheless, Bayne’s and Pacherie’s claim that the difficulties for the doxastic
account can be resolved if belief-ascriptions are context-dependent is by no means
beyond dispute. I now turn to a critical assessment of their attempt to make use of
Schwitzgebel’s dispositionalism in order to rescue doxasticism from the previously
discussed objections.
3. Can dispositionalism vindicate doxasticism?
Tumulty (2011) has been the first author to challenge Bayne’s and Pacherie’s appeal
to dispositionalism as a way to defend the doxastic conception of delusions. The core
of her strategy consists in highlighting two features of Schwitzgebel’s dispositionalism
that Bayne and Pacherie overlook and subsequently arguing that they can’t use that
view of belief to vindicate doxasticism. Tumulty claims that Bayne and Pacherie un-
deremphasize Schwitzgebel’s distinction between excused non-manifestations of dis-
positions and explained dispositional absences. In addition, she claims that they also
underemphasize the no-further-fact clause in Schwitzgebel’s account—that is, the ob-
servation that once a dispositional profile has been exhaustively specified, there is no
further factual question as to whether or not a subject really believes a given proposi-
tion. Tumulty argues that dispositionalism is neither plausible nor distinctive without
these points, and that these points clash with Bayne’s and Pacherie’s aims. In this sec-
tion, I present some of Tumulty’s points and assess whether they damage Bayne’s and
Pacherie’s dispositionalist response to the objections discussed.
3.1. Deviations, excuses, and explanations
Bayne and Pacherie see explanations of manifestation-failures as the way to make
room for ascriptions of belief in the context of delusions. However, Tumulty notes
that they seem to miss Schwitzgebel’s implicit distinction between excuses and ex-
planations. Whereas an excuse elucidates why someone fails to manifest a disposi-
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tion while suggesting she in fact has the disposition, an explanation of an apparent
manifestation-failure suggests not that a subject is inhibiting a manifestation of a dis-
position, but rather that the disposition in question is altogether absent. And, as we
saw, such a subject is said to deviate from the dispositional profile for the relevant
belief. It should be noted, however, that while we may seem to have evidence for the
absence of a disposition whenever we observe a manifestation-failure, only a subset
of those manifestation-failures are actually rooted in disposition-absences. Aware-
ness of excusing conditions is necessary if one is not to incorrectly judge a subject to
deviate from a dispositional stereotype she actually fits.
If we wish to use Schwitzgebel’s dispositionalism in order to count delusions as
beliefs, Tumulty suggests, we need to look for excuses for all the ways in which de-
luded subjects fail to look like ordinary believers with respect to the content of their
delusions. Bayne and Pacherie (2005, p.185) cite a fear of involuntary commitment,
for example, to account for the failure of some patients to act on their alleged be-
liefs. While this does look like an excuse in the required sense—some deluded sub-
jects may know that acting on their beliefs might result in hospitalization—Tumulty
is unswayed by the excessive generality of other non-standard situational features to
which they appeal in their attempt to account for other typical failures to manifest
belief-appropriate dispositions. If Bayne and Pacherie want to uphold a dispositional-
ist form of doxasticism, they must answer the question of whether delusional subjects
are inhibiting dispositions or rather lack them entirely. As we have seen, many de-
luded subjects act (or fail to act) in ways that make it likely they lack one or more of
the important dispositions in the stereotype for belief in the content of their delusion.
Of course, many non-deluded subjects also deviate from dispositional stereotypes for
beliefs that they attribute to themselves, or that others may be tempted to attribute
to them. But on the dispositionalist view of belief, the option of deciding that a devi-
ation is not important is left open, and that option may be available with respect to
subjects suffering from mental illness and abnormal/maladaptive behavior, as well
as with respect to normal subjects in the hold of irrational patterns of reasoning.
A dispositionalist about delusional belief may opt to argue that interpreters could
decide that a particular deviation from the dispositional stereotype for a given delu-
sion is relatively unimportant. That would preserve our ability to say that a pa-
tient really believes the content of her delusion. However, as Tumulty observes, that
wouldn’t preserve our ability to say that the sum total evidence of the patient’s dispo-
sitions points toward her so believing, where her so believing is a fact over and above
her having the dispositional profile she has: ‘It only preserves our ability to refer to
those dispositions without misleading our audience about them’ (2011, p.613). Thus,
while dispositionalism has the resources to generate the ascriptive claims Bayne and
Pacherie want, it does so at the cost of not giving them the same weight they do.
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3.2. Context-dependency
As we have seen, Bayne and Pacherie appropriate Schwitzgebel’s claim that belief-
ascription is context-dependent. In cases when a deviation cannot be readily excused
or explained, ‘whether or not the attributor ascribes the belief will depend on the
context of the belief ascription and what her interests are’ (2005, p.181). Tumulty
questions the strength of this appeal as a way to achieve a robust vindication of
doxasticism. To better understand her point we may briefly review the role of context
in Schwitzgebel’s account. In one of his examples he discusses
a child studying for a test [who] reads, ‘The Pilgrims landed at Plymouth
Rock in 1620,’ and remembers this fact. She is a bit confused about what
Pilgrims are, though: she is unsure whether they were religious refugees or
warriors or American natives. (2002, p.257)
Clearly this child (call her Jane) doesn’t fully fit the stereotype for believing that
the Pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock in 1620. She won’t be disposed to infer, for
example, that europeans landed at Plymouth Rock in 1620. In a case like this there
doesn’t seem to be any available excuse that would render the ascription of the rel-
evant belief uncontroversial. What (if anything) will determine the way we describe
Jane’s state are the practical matters with which we are concerned, such as her ‘likely
performance on a history dates quiz’ (Schwitzgebel 2002, p.257). The lesson to be
drawn from this, Tumulty argues, is that the introduction of belief-ascriptive language
doesn’t add to the information already available from the observation of the given
dispositional profile, but only refers to it in a convenient and perhaps helpful way.
Therefore, attending to the context of belief-ascription makes itself necessary when
attributors need to decide whether the use of ascriptive shorthand will be helpful to
their audience. It is in this way that Schwitzgebel’s dispositionalism provides us with
means to end disputes about how to describe in-between cases such as Jane’s.
In the most difficult cases for ascription, however, the communicative demands
on the attributor may not successfully determine whether or not it is appropriate to
describe the subject as believing the content of their self-deception, say, or of her
delusion. Cases like these, in which the set of ascribable dispositions available to the
interpreter is such a ‘mixed bag’, leave us only with the option of specification—that
is, describing how the subject’s dispositions conform to the stereotype for the belief in
question and how they deviate from it. There will be times, then, when withholding
the use of ascriptive language is going to be preferable so as not to mislead one’s
audience. Such cases are those in which the observable deviations raise questions
regarding both the content of the subject’s attitude, and the nature of the attitude
itself. So if there is no way to decide whether something is determinately a case of
belief, our move should be to allow some indeterminacy in our belief talk, for fear
that we should abandon it altogether. This is where Tumulty’s observations meet
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Schwitzgebel’s recent remarks on how to handle delusional states—or at least those
which defy ascriptive language and practice. He suggests that ‘believes that p’ should
be treated as a vague predicate admitting of vague cases:
In in-between cases of canonically vague predicates like ‘tall’, the appropri-
ateness of ascribing the predicate varies contextually, and often the best ap-
proach is to refuse to either simply ascribe or simply deny the predicate but
rather to specify more detail (e.g., ‘well, he’s five foot eleven inches’); so too,
I would argue, in in-between cases of belief. (2012, p.15)
Bayne and Pacherie want context-dependency, however, to support the view that delu-
sions are beliefs (or at least that some of them are), whereas all it can really offer us is
a pragmatic license to talk about delusions as beliefs whenever this is not apt to mis-
lead our intended audience, and whenever there is no better alternative. Therefore,
dispositionalism cannot grant them a definitive victory over competing accounts. Be-
sides, it is conceivable that among the many cases that defy belief-ascriptive language
there might be some cases of delusion that imagining-ascriptive language is better
suited to describe (even if in localized instances, for the benefit of particular audi-
ences). The fact that belief-ascriptive shorthand caters to the context and interests
of the ascribers defeats Bayne’s and Pacherie’s purpose of defending a full-blooded
doxastic view of delusions by appeal to dispositionalism about belief.
3.3. Revisiting the objections to the doxastic account
Finally, in order to complete our assessment of Bayne’s and Pacherie’s dispositional-
ist approach to delusions, I now turn to presenting and discussing their answers to
the objections to the doxastic account I presented above, which they separate into
three classes: content-based, evidence-based, and commitment-based. Their answers
to the first two families of objections do not depend on dispositionalism, but rather
on the contention that their proponents exaggerate the connections between belief
and logical possibility on the one hand, and between belief and evidence on the other.
The first and second objections presented earlier (‘Lack of content’ and ‘Self-
defeating content’) converge in holding that what is allegedly believed by delusional
subjects clashes with the nature of belief, because believability is taken to imply that
the content be meaningful and logically possible. While not all delusional contents
raise this kind of objection, those of Cotard and other delusions do. To which Bayne
and Pacherie respond first by suggesting that ‘issues of belief-ascription are best ap-
proached via the question of predictive leverage rather than claims about logical
possibility’ (2005, p.182). Indeed, there seems to be no principled reason to deny
that even the most bizarre delusions lack content only in the sense and to the extent
that they are obviously false or incoherent. If ‘I am dead’ really were necessarily false
Principia 19(3): 379–404 (2015).
394 José Eduardo Porcher
or pragmatically self-defeating, a stronger case could be made. Bayne and Pacherie
argue that it is neither, at least in a number of very common usages—for example,
those in which dying does not mean ceasing to exist. For example, consider the fol-
lowing testimony by Esmé Weijun Wang, a writer responsible for what is perhaps the
only extant first-person account of the experience of Cotard delusion (quoted with
permission).
In the beginning of my own experience with Cotard’s delusion, I woke my
husband before sunup. Daphne, our dog, stirred, began thumping her pa-
pillon-mutt tail against the bedsheets. I’d been in my studio, but now I was
shaking my husband, and I was crying with joy.
‘I’m dead,’ I said, ‘and you’re dead, and Daphne is dead, but now I get to do
it over. Don’t you see? I have a second chance. I can do better now.’
Chris said, gently, ‘I think you’re alive.’
But this statement, of course, meant nothing. It was his opinion, and I had
my solid belief. I can state that the sky is green, but will you see it as such? I
felt buoyant at the belief that I was getting a second chance in some kind of
afterlife –U˚ it caused me to be kinder, to be more generous. I wasn’t irritated
by problems with computer downloads. I was sweet to telemarketers. It was
true that I was dead, but I believed it made sense to play-act normalcy, or
rather, an improved version of normalcy, because of the additional belief
that I was in an afterlife. According to the logic of my delusion, this afterlife
was given to me because I hadn’t done enough to show compassion in my
“real” life; and though I was now dead, my death was also an optimistic
opportunity. (Wang 2014)
Note that Wang’s conviction that she was dead was not completely circumscribed (or
at least not completely), since she also formed the coherent conviction that she was
experiencing an afterlife-likely an abductive explanation of the unshakeable convic-
tion (the fact) that, although dead, she remained a subject of experiences.
In turn, the third objection presented earlier (‘Lack of evidence’) views the ab-
sence of support for that which is allegedly believed as conflicting with the nature
of belief. In fact, as we saw, delusions typically are held in the face of overwhelm-
ing evidence to the contrary. Bayne and Pacherie do not view this as a real problem
for doxasticism, denying that there is a constitutive connection between belief and
evidence. Work by a multitude of researchers has established the existence—indeed,
the prevalence—of non-rational elements in belief-formation and maintenance, such
as cognitive biases and motivation (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Cherniak 1986; Kunda
1990). They also point out that there seems to be no principled reason to deny the
possibility of beliefs being formed as a consequence of brain damage (perhaps not
directly). Also, many proponents of so-called bottom-up accounts of delusion claim
that at least some delusions are grounded in evidence of a sort (Bayne and Pacherie
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2004). Such accounts suggest that first-person evidence—evidence gathered directly
from one’s own experience, as opposed to the views of other people or to general
knowledge—is at the source of delusion-formation (Davies et al., 2001). It may be
worth noting that at least some beliefs in articles of faith are based in what Bayne
and Pacherie refer to as ‘first-person evidence’, which may be as flimsy as a ‘sense’
that something is true.
Finally, it is the fourth, fifth, and sixth objections presented earlier (‘Theoreti-
cal reasoning’, ‘Practical reasoning’, and ‘Lack of appropriate affect’) that Bayne and
Pacherie respond to by invoking dispositionalism. These objections view the deluded
subject’s circumscribed rational, behavioral and affective responses as conflicting
with the nature of belief. In the context of dispositionalism, the set of commitment-
based objections can be thought of as asserting that delusional subjects who seem
to believe that p deviate so much from the dispositional profile associated with the
belief that p that the burden of demonstrating that we should think of them as believ-
ers of p falls squarely with those who wish to defend doxasticism. Their answers to
the first two, and most substantive, objections in this group appeal to non-standard
aspects of the delusional person’s situation that they claim satisfactorily excuse (in
the above-discussed, semi-technical sense) the occasional absence of manifestations
relevant to the stereotypical dispositions expected to compose the profile.
Theoretical reason, revisited
The first non-standard features appealed to by Bayne and Pacherie are the unusual
perceptual and affective experiences of deluded subjects, and they are invoked to
meet the objection from theoretical reason. It should be noted that this answer de-
pends on a bottom-up explanation of delusions. If, as bottom-up theorists claim,
monothematic delusions are grounded in unusual experiences, then, they claim,
‘these conditions may be thought to excuse the patient from manifesting the cog-
nitive dispositions stereotypically associated with their belief’ (2005, p.184). Bayne
and Pacherie illustrate this with the case of the Capgras delusion, for which there are
strong bottom-up explanations (Bayne and Pacherie 2004; Pacherie 2009). The con-
clusion they extract from such accounts of Capgras is that the patients aremanifesting
the relevant cognitive dispositions, such as the inclination to test their delusion and
consider evidence, and that their abnormal perceptual and affective experiences con-
tinually reinforce their delusional belief. But in order for this answer to add to the
defense of doxasticism, distinct bottom-up accounts of all the other (monothematic)
delusions must be developed. These accounts must show that the subjects of other
monothematic delusions have perceptual abnormalities that precipitate their delu-
sions, and also that those perceptual abnormalities cause the cognitive dispositions
that are distinctive of belief.
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However, hypothesis evaluation and verification isn’t something one can point to
in every case. For instance, in the case of delusions of thought-insertion or alien con-
trol, which involve the belief that one doesn’t have ownership, and is not in control
of, one’s own thoughts and the actions that may emanate thereof (Pacherie, Green
and Bayne 2006). While the hypothesis that someone is putting thoughts into one’s
head is antecedently highly implausible in the context of normal conceptions of cau-
sation, Bayne and Pacherie claim that the abnormal experience of agency to which
some delusional persons are subjected precludes them from having normal ideas
about causation and probability. The hypothesis of thought-insertion may then be
formed to make sense of the anomaly, and given that there seemingly is no way to
gather evidence for or against such a hypothesis, Bayne and Pacherie claim that its
maintenance is understandable. They suggest that we are entitled to assume that the
dispositions relevant for the delusional belief are not only present, but also being
manifested (though, puzzlingly enough, this cannot be observed).
If such unusual conceptions of causation are at play—seeing that the subject fails
to give up her aberrant state via the consideration of its extraordinary implausibility—
then what entitles us to assume that her deviations are excusable? This question is
rendered irrelevant by the recognition that the two arguments based on the non-
standard features presented by Bayne and Pacherie actually aren’t aimed at providing
excuses at all. As Tumulty observes, ‘They aim to show that we have failed to see
subjects’ activities as manifestations of those dispositions’ (2011, p.606).
Practical reason, revisited
The third feature Bayne and Pacherie discuss is disrupted motivation, and it is in-
voked to answer the objection from practical reason. That is, it is meant to explain
why deluded subjects don’t manifest the behavioral dispositions (relevant to belief
in the delusional content) that they may nevertheless have. Before discussing moti-
vation, however, they remind proponents of the objection that, as psychiatrists know
all too well, delusion-generated action is not as rare as is often thought. Indeed,
Cotard patients often become akinetic and stop everyday activities like eating and
washing (Young and Leafhead 1996). Patients suffering from delusions of guilt or
self-accusation, sometimes as a consequence of psychotic depression, often engage
in physical self-punishment and many attempt suicide (Miller and Chabrier 1988).
Patients of de Clérambault’s syndrome—as a consequence of falsely believing that
another person is secretely in love with them—write letters, make phone calls, send
gifts, pay visits, and in a number of cases become violent toward the unwitting ob-
ject of their obsession (Berrios and Kennedy 2002). The list could go on indefinitely,
since it simply isn’t true that delusional subjects are always inert with respect to the
delusional content (Bortolotti 2010, p.162–7).
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Nevertheless, as we have seen, there are many cases in which delusions don’t
cause people to act in the expected ways. In the idiom of dispositionalism: the ab-
sence of appropriate behavioral responses challenges belief-ascription. To account
for these localized absences of behavioral manifestations, Bayne and Pacherie point
out that action is not caused by cognitive states alone but by cognitive states in con-
junction with motivational states, and that the motivation to act may not be acquired
or not sustained in some cases. Bortolotti and Broome (2012) argue that this may
be due to avolition, to emotional disturbances, or to the fact that, given the pecu-
liar content of some delusions, the surrounding environment does not support the
agent’s motivation to act. Moreover, among the causes for disrupted motivation may
also be the very content of a patient’s delusion. Some contents, such as ‘there is a
nuclear power station inside my body’ (David 1990), may not be conducive to any
appropriate course of action.
These causes are reflected in Bayne’s and Pacherie’s example of choice, which
is that of deluded patients who know that acting on their beliefs might result in
hospitalization (Stone and Young 1997). As a consequence, they keep from acting
in the way the dispositional profiles for the relevant delusional beliefs would lead
us to expect. As Tumulty (2011, p.607) observes, such distinctive belief-desire pairs
can function successfully as excuses, explaining why a subject fails to manifest a
disposition without undermining the idea that she has the disposition. Indeed, to a
lesser extent than delusional subjects, normal subjects also act in ways which are
inconsistent with some of their reported beliefs (e.g., when they are hypocritical), as
well as fail to act on some of their beliefs for lack of motivation (e.g., when they are
weak-willed). The problem is that to decisively answer the objection from agency,
Bayne and Pacherie need some account of those subjects who don’t have distinctive
belief-desire pairs to rationalize their behavior (or lack thereof).
One way to approach this would be to claim that since those subjects have gen-
erally disrupted motivation, they fail to act in the relevant way. However, regarding
such a lack of motivation as sufficient to explain all of a subject’s failures to manifest
relevant behavioral dispositions would also open the possibility that the dispositions
aren’t there at all. That is, it would open the possibility that if the subject fails to act
on her delusion it is because he does not fully believe the content of her delusion.
In this spirit, Tumulty argues that in some cases, in which subjects fail to manifest
the behavioral dispositions in the profile for belief (e.g. that their spouse has been
abducted), the explanation is simply that the subject lacks these dispositions. This
in turn is due to a persistent, if not permanent, lack of other relevant cognitive and
phenomenal dispositions, which indicates that the subject falls short of full-fledged
belief.
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Lack of appropriate affect, revisited
Finally, Bayne’s and Pacherie’s answer to the last objection presented earlier (‘Lack
of appropriate affect’) doesn’t appeal to any non-standard features. They concede
that many deluded subjects have deviant emotional and affective responses to the
contents of their delusions (for example, some Capgras sufferers are unconcerned
about the supposed impostor in their homes). They don’t attempt to excuse this de-
viance but instead resist the thought that emotional and affective dispositions are
constitutive elements of the belief stereotype. They also observe that the ascription
of emotional states is far from straightforward, since the subjective experience of
emotion can dissociate from the behavioral features of emotion—some depressive
patients, for instance, have the former but not the latter (Bentall 2003, p.225). Given
the connection between some forms of delusion and depression, Bayne and Pacherie
assert that some delusional patients may also have subjective experiences associated
with certain emotions even when they lack the appropriate manifestations. ‘If so, the
question of whether such individuals have a certain emotion might not admit of a
definitive answer’ (2005, p.184).
Although Schwitzgebel states that the dispositional profiles for some beliefs will
include dispositions to be in certain emotional states, Bayne and Pacherie are, of
course, free to endorse a version of dispositionalism in which some beliefs which
would normally be accompanied by a particular emotional state should be present
in the absence of that state, as Tumulty points out (2011, p.20). However, doing so
raises a new problem, namely, that reducing the number of dispositions in a profile
increases the importance of the remaining dispositions. Suppose (for the sake of the
argument) that the dispositional profile for a particular belief is taken to contain five
dispositions. That means that a person who is missing one of them has four chances
to match the profile in other ways, and hence other people have four dispositions to
point to in assessing whether or not the person fits the profile. Now suppose that the
dispositional profile for a particular belief is taken to contain only three dispositions.
Now a person who is missing one of them has only two chances to match the profile
in other ways.
Tumulty’s concern about Bayne’s and Pacherie’s claim that emotional dispositions
never count as essential to any profile for belief, then, is that it leaves would-be be-
lievers with fewer dispositions in their respective profiles. That raises the probability,
with each disposition they lack, that that lack will be the one that tips them over into
no longer counting as believers of the relevant proposition (since they are no longer
meeting the key portions of the profile). Given that the delusion-prone population
has a lot of trouble matching profiles, giving them fewer chances to do so consists
in a doubtful move. While their failure to have the ‘right’ emotion no longer counts
against them, their failure to (say) have an appropriate disposition to action counts
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against them more than it otherwise would. Furthermore, putting more weight on
other kinds of dispositions is problematic because delusional subjects don’t necessar-
ily do a better job at maintaining those dispositions. Hence, removing the expectation
that delusional subjects manifest the relevant emotions dispositions does not make
it easier to count them as believers.
4. Conclusion
Tumulty’s careful consideration of the features to which Bayne and Pacherie call
attention—abnormal perceptual experiences, abnormal experiences of agency, and
disrupted motivation—shows that appealing to these features does not really help
us reach the conclusion at which they aimed to arrive, namely, that most delusional
subjects in fact have the belief-relevant dispositions they apparently fail to manifest.
As far as I can see, Tumulty’s results point to a disjunction: we must opt either for
doxasticism, or for dispositionalism about delusions. Of course, if one were to opt
for defending doxasticism, answers to the usual objections would have to be devised
without Bayne’s and Pacherie’s appeal to dispositionalism. An industrious attempt at
such an undertaking has been recently presented by Bortolotti (2010). She does not,
however, present us with good enough reasons to discard the kind of approach that
has been the center of this investigation.
At first, Bortolotti (2010, p.20–1) dismisses what she terms the ‘sliding scale’ ap-
proach on the questionable grounds that such an approach, by not giving a straight-
forward answer to the question ‘Does the patient believe that p?’, is unable to char-
acterize precisely whether the patient’s actions are intentional, which complicates
issues of ethical and policy-guiding import. However, as Schwitzgebel rightly recog-
nizes, apart from that not being nearly enough reason to discard an approach without
more ado, its proponents might just as well suggest that ‘in many cases of delusion
it shouldn’t be straightforward to assess intentionality, and that the ethical and pol-
icy applications are complicated, so that a philosophical approach that renders these
matters straightforward is misleadingly simplistic’ (2012, p.15). Ironically, toward
the end of her book, Bortolotti hints at the in-between approach we have been dis-
cussing when she writes:
Rarely do we have these clear-cut cases . . . Most of the delusions we read
about, and we come across, are integrated in the subject’s narrative, to some
extent, and with limitations. They may be excessively compartmentalized,
for instance, or justified tentatively. That is what makes it so difficult to dis-
cuss the relationship between delusions, subjects’ commitment to the con-
tent of the delusion, and autonomy. As authorship comes in degrees, so does
the capacity to manifest the endorsement of the delusional thought in au-
tonomous thought and action. (2010, p.252)
Principia 19(3): 379–404 (2015).
400 José Eduardo Porcher
As Schwitzgebel observes, from the fact that Bortolotti (2010, p.242) regards author-
ship and endorsement as necessary for belief, it seems to follow that in the quoted
passage she is acknowledging that many actual delusions are in-between cases of be-
lief. This wavering on Bortolotti’s part is symptomatic of an increasingly widespread,
if latent, perception of which a recent formulation can be found in Bayne’s assertion
that ‘there may not be enough determinacy in our ordinary conception of belief for
there to be a fact of the matter as to whether many belief-like states are really beliefs
or not’ (2010, p.332). I would like to conclude this inquiry with a few additional
points in favor of pursuing a sliding scale approach along the lines of what may have
been originally contemplated by Bayne and Pacherie, but this time definitively for-
feiting the ambition to ascribe doxastic status to ‘most’ delusional states—a method-
ological approach to which it seems Bayne himself may now be open, and which
is suggested both by the recognition that delusions resist unqualified ascription of
doxastic status, and by the preceding analysis of the failed attempt at vindicating
doxasticism by resorting to dispositionalism.
I want to claim that the difficulties I have surveyed concerning the ascription
of belief to delusional subjects are not due to our limited epistemic perspective—by
which I consciously imply that whatever indeterminacy we face in our attempts is an
indeterminacy inherent in our folk psychology. This claim concerns the nature of the
folk-psychological notion of belief and the limits of its application. The underlying
assumption in almost all discussions of the doxastic status of borderline phenomena
(including self-deception, implicit bias, etc.) is that somehow there are necessary and
sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of belief, such that any given
mental state can be determinately classified as either being, or failing to be, a belief.
Such an assumption seems groundless for the simple reason that ‘belief’ is a vague
concept. Undoubtedly it is a helpful tool in predicting and explaining behavior in
ordinary circumstances, which happens when all (or most of) the plausible candi-
dates for assessing its presence converge on the same result—or in dispositionalist
terms, when the belief-relevant dispositions are manifested. However, this does not
mean that there is always a fact of the matter as to whether a subject believes a given
proposition. The appropriate response when ascription breaks down, and when per-
sistent disagreement over how to describe a certain kind of mental state arises, is to
recognize that no single set of rules is privileged by our ordinary (folk) practices.
I am aware that such an answer may seem unhelpful, and I agree that it should
be accompanied by a positive lesson and a direction for future research, in keeping
with the goal of attaining a better understanding of delusions and other puzzling
phenomena. It is not easy to rest content with a conclusion such as that ‘there is a
proposition concerning which there is evidence that the subject believes it, and evi-
dence that they do not, and that is the best that can be said’ (Hamilton 2007, p.231).
Indeed, we can bemore informative than that. In order to adequately characterize the
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cognitive states of delusional and other deeply conflicted subjects, we should (in the
appropriate contexts) abandon the idea that simple folk-psychological abstractions
should frame research into complex and variegated psychological and psychiatric
conditions and, rather, descend to lower levels of explanation, namely, to the various
neurobiological and cognitive processes that make up the profile of the subjects in the
grasp of the relevant phenomenon. This chimes with Schwitzgebel’s aforementioned
suggestion that we should treat ‘belief’ as a vague predicate and, when confronted
with difficulties of ascription stemming from its vagueness, we should turn to pro-
viding as much further detail as we may be able to come up with. This will not be
achieved by looking for precision where it cannot be found.
Somy conclusion is not quite that, say, the Capgras patient doesn’t believe that her
loved one has been replaced by a double, or that the Cotard patient doesn’t believe
that she is dead. Rather, it is that the question as to whether these subjects believe the
content of their delusions cannot be answeredwith a plain ‘yes’ or ‘no’—which doesn’t
mean we should give up our efforts to understand delusion, but that we should shift
our attention to what we can do. In this, I enthusiastically agree with Graham that
since ‘delusions [are] messy, compound, and complex psychological states or atti-
tudes (thoughts, feelings, and so on), defined more by how persons mismanage their
content and fail to prudently act in terms of them, than by qualifying as beliefs,’ a
realistic picture of delusion ‘should leave room for the clinical vagaries of delusional
presentation and not try to funnel each case of delusion through the taxonomic fil-
ter of the propositional attitude of belief’ (2010b, p.337). The prolonged debate over
how to characterize delusional states is predominantly due to participants using folk-
psychological tools that simply can’t handle the task.
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Notes
1 In listing these objections I largely follow the excellent survey provided by Bayne and
Pacherie (2005), as well as the discussion of problematic features of delusion by Stephens
and Graham (2004), Egan (2009) and Bortolotti (2010).
2 I say ‘appropriate’ rather than ‘necessary’ because circumscribed (insulated) “beliefs” will
usually stand in a number of (nonlogical) connections to the subject’s other mental states:
that of being simultaneously held to begin with, and then that of causing or being caused by
other mental states.
3 It must be noted, however, that on Putnam’s account these are not just properties ‘we are apt
to associate’ with a tiger—they are criteria of tigerhood. Putnam’s concept of a stereotype, in
other words, is an epistemological one: a stereotype is the set of properties we use to identify
something as an F, and it is to be sharply distinguished both from the (psychological) notion
of ‘what we are apt to associate’ with an F and from the (metaphysical) notion of what makes
an F an F. So the stereotype of water is: ‘insipid, odorless, etc. liquid which quenches thirst,
is found in lakes, rivers etc.’ Yet that is not what water is: water is a chemical substance with
the formula H2O. See also Lecture III in Kripke (1980).
4 Although grammatically in the indicative mood, I suspect a subjunctive conditional is what
is meant here (as betrayed in the surface grammar by the use of ‘will’, implying necessity),
namely: ‘If condition C were to hold, the object O would (be likely to) enter (or remain) in
state S’. The latter sentence states explicitly that there is a nomic connection between being
in condition C and entering (or remaining) in state S, something which no strictly indicative
conditional would have the force to express (‘If P then Q’ iff ‘Not-P and/or Q’: no law to be
found there). For a classic discussion, see the first chapter in Goodman (1983).
5 It must be noted, however, that the strength of Davidson’s and Dennett’s constraint isn’t the
same. While Davidson leaves room for further inquiry by postulating the need for ‘a large
degree of rationality’, Dennett’s constraint seems impervious to qualification. Though a very
interesting debate in itself, I must leave the tenability of rationality constraints on belief-
ascription aside for reasons of space and scope. But see Bortolotti (2004; 2005).
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